ESSAY

ON BEING A RELIGIOUS PROFESSIONAL: THE RELIGIOUS
TURN IN PROFESSIONAL ETHICS'
MARTHA MINOWt

What divides Senator Joseph Lieberman and ChiefJustice William
Rehnquist? I assume many things, such as the street between the
Capitol building and the Supreme Court, but it strikes me as surprising that Democratic and Jewish Senator Lieberman has argued that
individuals' religious beliefs and practices should guide their professional conduct while Republican and Lutheran Rehnquist has disagreed. Attorney General John Ashcroft may represent the bridging
example: he certainly thought his religious views should animate his
role as a legislator, but recently indicated that professional duties at
the Department of Justice would require him to enforce laws with
which he has had religious objections.
These are not simply isolated individuals. The growing attention
to what it means to be a Catholic lawyer, a Jewish judge, or a Christian
doctor occupies not only pages in academic journals but also bulletin
boards and panel discussions at professional schools and, increasingly,
broad public debate. (There is almost nothing, by the way, about
Moslems, Hindus, or members of other religions, and my remarks, unfortunately, will do little to remedy this lack.)
Why is there a turn to religion now in discussions of professional
conduct? What are the benefits and worries that this turn signals?
And what paths can individuals and institutions use to navigate the
emerging debate over the place of religion in professional life? These
are the questions that I will explore here.

" Delivered as the Owen J. Roberts Memorial Lecture, University of Pennsylvania
Law School, February 8, 2001.
t Professor, Harvard Law School. Thanks to Joe Singer, Robert Singer, Peter Adland, Bill Stuntz, Andrew Williams, and to the University of Pennsylvania audience for
conversations about this topic.
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I. WHY Now?
It is not obvious what to use as a baseline, and I do not pretend to
offer scientific assessment, but even a casual observation detects surging interest in the specific relevance of particular religions to professional practices and the general pertinence of religion to public debates. Take the law review literature. Attention to religion and
professional practice always occupied specialized religious journals,
such as The Catholic Lawyer,' but now mainstream journals are in the
business. When Thomas Shaffer and Robert Cover wrote in the early
1980s connecting religion and the work of lawyers, theirs were rare
voices. But it is not unusual now to see religious sources-ranging
from the Talmud to papal teachings-cited in law review footnotes.4

I See Joseph T. Tinnelly, The Catholic Lawyer-An Idea and
a Program, 1 CATH.
LAW. 3, 4 (1955) (announcing the mission of the journal as "provid[ing] reliable information in a wide variety of legal subjects of interest or importance to Catholics, to
the Catholic Church or to Catholic lawyers"); see also HenryJ. Hyde, Contemporary Challenges to Catholic Lawyers, 38 CATH. LAW. 75, 85-86 (1998) (challenging "Catholic lawyers and public advocates" to rely on their faith in order to repair the "damage done to
the moral foundations of our democracy" through recent legislative and judicial developments); Symposium, Lawyering and Personal Values, 38 CATH. LAW. 145 (1998)
(presenting debate attempting to resolve the "current ethical crisis" felt by lawyers
whose religious faith conflicts with their professional obligations).
2 See, e.g., Marie A. Failinger, The Justice Who Wouldn't Be
Lutheran: Toward Borrowing the Wisdom ofFaith Traditions,46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 643, 647 (1998) (arguing that "a
judge's religious understandings may usefully inform the rhetorical elements of his
opinion"); Alex Kozinski & Leslie A. Hakala, Keeping Secrets: Religious Duty vs. Professional Obligation, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 747 (1999) (examining whether professional confidentiality obligations impermissibly burden an attorney's exercise of religion);
Sanford Levinson, The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil Religion: Catholics BecomingJustices,39 DEPAUL L. REv. 1047, 1048 (1990) (using the confirmation hearings of
Catholic nominees to the United States Supreme Court to "examine some of the implications of the subsuming of religious identities within the more secular ... culture
of American constitutionalism"); Russell G. Pearce, TheJewish Lawyer's Question, 27 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 1259 (1996) (considering the effects ofJewish ethnic and religious identity on the professional attitudes and goals of Jewish lawyers); Dennis Turner, Infusing
Ethical, Moral, and Religious Values into a Law School Curriculum, 24 U. DAYTON L. REV.
283, 284-86 (1999) (citing efforts by Yale Law School professors to incorporate religious teachings into the curriculum).
3 THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER:

LAW FOR THE

INNOCENT (1981); Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,97 HARV. L. REV. 4

(1983), reprinted in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW:
COVER 95 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992).

THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT

See, e.g., Paula Abrams, The Tradition of Reproduction, 37 ARIZ. L.
REV. 453, 457
n.24 (1995) (TALMUD, Yebamoth 63b); George P. Fletcher, Three Nearly Sacred Books in
Western Law, 54 ARK. L. REV. 1, 8 n.23 (2001) (TALMUD, Baba Mezi'a 59b); Jonathan
Granoff, Nuclear Weapons, Ethics, Morals, and Law, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1413, 1422 n.37
(TALMUD, Shabbath 31a); Jack L. Sammons, Rank Strangers to Me, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE
4
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Howard Lesnick's recent book is a deep and wide meditation on religion in dialectic with law over the past thirty years.5 The more typical
legal scholarly treatment is a narrower enterprise. It begins by noting
an apparent crisis in the legal profession or a decline in ethics among
lawyers. It then advises a search for virtue and goodness that religious
teachings, beliefs, and institutions can assist." Some observers have
noted that critics, since time immemorial, have decried the ethical crisis of the legal profession,' but the cries became louder and more
widespread after the Watergate scandals. The thinness of professional
ethics, uninformed by religion, is another repeated theme." Many enas
of professionalization
dorse Sandy Levinson's critique
as
religion
such
individual,
"bleach [ing]" out important aspects of the
and ethnicity. 9 Others join Stephen Carter in criticizing the trivializaRoCK L. REV. 1, 12 n.45 (1995) (TALMUD, Kiddushin 80b); Douglas W. Kmiec, Is the
American Democracy Compatible with the Catholic Faith?, 41 AM. J. JURIS. 69, 72 & n.8
(1996) (POPE PIUS XI, QUADRAGESIMO ANNO (1931)); Joseph S. Spoerl, Making Laws
on Making Babies: Ethics, Public Policy, and Reproductive Technology, 45 AM. J. JURIS. 93,
109 n.27 (2000) (same); Jeremy Waldron, On the Road: Good Samaritans and Compelling
Duties, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1053, 1053-54 (2000) (Luke 10:27-:37).
5 HOWARD LESNICK, LISTENING FOR GOD: RELIGION AND MORAL DISCERNMENT
(1998).
C See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, Professing Professionals: Christian Pilots on the River of
Law, 38 CATH. LAW. 151, 164 (1998) ("Christianity may affect lawyers not only in how
they generally understand or structure their professional life, but also in their day-today manner of practice .... ); SamuelJ. Levine, Introductory Note: Symposium on Laryering and Personal Values-Respondingto the Problems of Ethical Schizophrenia, 38 CATHiI. LAW.
145, 148 (1998) ("Religious values, in particular, have gained increasing prominence
in the arena of legal ethics, as they present a comprehensive system of ethics for lawyers seeking to integrate their personal and professional lives.").
7 Cf Robert W. Gordon, Law as a Vocation: Holmes and the Lawryer's Path, in THE
PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE: THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.
7, 7-9 (StevenJ. Burton ed., 2000) (articulating Holmes's view that a lawyer who acts as
"the mere unthinking instrument of clients' passions and partisan ends" is a villain);
Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise:
1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70, 99 (Gerald

L. Geison ed., 1983) (noting late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century speeches
calling for a return to civic ideals in the legal profession).
8 See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAvWYERS 78-79 (1994)
("[F]ormal codes of ethics never aimed at capturing the entire ensemble of understandings that lawyers observe in their dealings .... [W] here ethical problems of great
complexity are concerned, formal canons afford little guidance."); ANTHONY T.
KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993) (developing the importance of practical wisdom
as a necessary supplement to traditional legal training and methods).
9 E.g., Russell G. Pearce, Learningfrom the Unpleasant Truths of Interfaith Conversation: William Stringfellow's Lessons for theJewish Lawyer, 38 CATH. LAW. 255, 263 (1998)
(citing Levinson, infra note 75); Nancy B. Rapoport, Living "Top-Down" in a 'Bottom-Up"
World: Musings on the Relationship Between Jewish Ethics and Legal Ethics, 78 NEB. L. REV.
18, 26 (1999).
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tion of religion in contemporary life and disdain for religion in the
academy.1l
In medicine, rising interest in spirituality and the role of religion
in healing has produced scholarship, conferences, training, and research centers." Fueled perhaps by patients' concerns, this trend also
reflects greater interest in spirituality among younger doctors. 2 Respecting the specific religious beliefs of a diverse patient group has
become a vital agenda for hospitals, medical schools, and nursing
training not only to guard against discrimination but also to enhance
the quality of care and results. Religion, in short, is a very hot topic in
medical ethics today.
These changes in the legal and medical professions are part of
larger trends. Whatever your qualms about President Bush's proposals to increase government support for faith-based initiatives, 3 candidate Gore endorsed very similar initiatives. Both have personal convictions leading them in this direction, but they also have
10STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF:
How AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993).
11 See, e.g., Linda L. Barnes et al., Spirituality,
Religion, and Pediatrics: Intersecting
Worlds of Healing, 106 PEDIATRICS 899, 905 (2000) ("The changing religious and cultural landscape of the United States makes it imperative that pediatricians understand
the role of diverse spiritual and religious issues in the context of pediatric practice.");
Anne M. Nordhaus-Bike, A Calling to Care, HOSPITALS & HEALTH NETWORKS, Dec.
1998, at 22 (describing the medical services provided by parish nurses in Richmond,
Virginia); Richard P. Sloan et al., Religion, Spirituality and Medicine, 353 LANCET 664
(1999) (evaluating various studies attempting to establish a connection between physical health and religious faith); Jan Ziegler, SpiritualityReturns to the Fold in Medical Practice, 90J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1255, 1255 (1998) ("Increasingly, religion and spirituality are now seen as factors in patient relations and in quality of life-attracting
increased attention in cancer research and practice.").
12 Ziegler, supra note 11, at 1256.
13 See, e.g., Zev Chafets, W's Faith-BasedFunding:
An Idea Not to Believe In, DAILY

NEWS (New York), Feb. 9, 2001, at 49 (calling Bush's plan a "terrible and dangerous
idea"); Joseph Chuman, A Return to the 19th Century, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.),
Feb. 11, 2001, at 3 (arguing that faith-based initiatives compromise "religious freedom
and government neutrality toward the churches"); Albert Kovetz, Bush's Plan Would Be
Divisive, PALM BEACH POST, Feb. 11, 2001, at 4E (suggesting alternatives to President
Bush's proposed funding of religious chartiable organizations); Sue Anne Pressley,
Faith-Based Groups Under Fresh Scrutiny, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2001, at A3 (noting concerns that federal funding of faith-based social service programs could violate the constitutional separation of church and state); Kenneth Roe, Faith-Based Groups Need Safeguards, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 10, 2001, at 29A ("Mr. Bush's proposal threatens
to roll back years of work on church-state separation .... ).
14 See Joan Lowy, Gore's Embrace of CharitableChoice Stuns Civil
Libertarians,SCRIPPS
HOWARD NEWS SERVICE, May 30, 1999, at A13 (describing Vice President Gore's support for charitable choice programs that would allow government aid of religious social service organizations).
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sophisticated pollsters. Their pollsters no doubt found trends similar
to those documented most recently in a study entitled For Goodness'5
American Life.1
Sake: Why So Many Want Religion to Play a GreaterRole in
Produced for the nonprofit Public Agenda group and funded by the
Pew Charitable Trusts, this study summarized findings from 1,507 halfhour telephone interviews of adults in the general public conducted
in November 2000, and a mail survey of religious leaders, public officials, and journalists. The study found that a large proportion of respondents believe that religion helps improve individual behavior and
conduct. Indeed, 69% of respondents answered that "[m] ore religion
is the best way to strengthen family values and moral behavior."'16
Eighty-five percent answered that parents would do a better job raising
their kids if more Americans were to become deeply religious; 79%,
that crime would decrease; and 69%, that greed and materialism
would decrease. 17 The largest majority-96%-agreed that "one of
the greatest things about this country is that people can practice
whatever religion they choose," and more than half (58%) agreed that
belief in God is not necessary to be a moral person or to have good
values. 8 And 52% of respondents worried that an increase in intolerance toward people with unconventional lifestyles would increase if
more people became deeply religious.' 9 Only a majority of Jews and
nonreligious people-when examined separately-opposed prayer in
public schools. ° In contrast, a large majority of all those sampled70%-favor daily prayer spoken in the classroom, and 56% thought
school prayer is "one of the most effective ways to improve the values
and behavior of young people."' And again it is 70%-perhaps the
same 70%-who said that they want religion's influence in America to
22
grow.
Behind these survey results, I suspect, are two short-term and one
longer-tenn phenomenon. First, it is no small matter, I think, that the

15 STEvE FARKAS ET AL., FOR GOODNESS' SAKE: WHY SO MANY WANT RELIGION
TO

PLAYA GREATER ROLE IN AMERICAN LIFE 7 (2001) ("Americans often name loss of relig-

ion as a leading cause of intractable social problems such as drugs and crime."), available at http://www.publicagenda.org/specials/religion/religion.htm (last visited Oct.
31, 2001).
16 Id. at 11.
17 Id. at
12.
18 Id.
at 13.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 17.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 44.
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baby-boomers are getting older. As boomers age, they-we-have
looked for ways to raise children in a violent and commercial world,
and also looked for meaning and support in dealing with both material success and personal challenges, such as illness and the deaths of
friends and family members. Coincidentally, boomers largely control
mass media, private institutions, and public debate. This enables us to
project our own concerns onto the public stage even more directly
than when we tried to steer the political and cultural agenda through
activism in the '60s.
Second, in the recent decade, wide perceptions of national and
global problems have led many people of all generations into spiritual
and religious searches. Local scandals can have this effect. Remember how President Clinton turned to ministers not only for forgiveness
but also for their public relations effect? More profoundly, drug and
alcohol abuse, related crime, and the persistent poverty of many,
alongside the raging and at times conspicuous consumption of others,
lead many to seek grounds for critique and reform. Internationally,
inter-ethnic violence and genocide, and the international versions of
widespread suffering alongside remarkable bounty, generate similar
searches for intellectual, political, and moral critique, resulting in
mobilization and response. After the terrorist attacks of September
11, churches, synagogues, and mosques became filled with people
searching for reassurance, community, and belief.
But a deeper, longer trend across longer time spans is also vital to
this transition. The past two centuries mark a period of secularization
followed by recent expressions of religious reaction. After the religious wars in Europe, political thinkers such as John Locke argued for
separating church and state, and political actors such as Thomas Jef23
ferson tried to institutionalize such ideas.
Yet from our vantage
point, even such people assumed far greater scope and influence for

23

John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), in 6 THE WORKS OFJOHN

LOCKE 47-48 (1812) (arguing for a "law of toleration" under which "no-body ought to
be compelled in matters of religion either by law or force"); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association Uan. 1, 1802), in 16 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281-82 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Bergh eds.,
1904) (assuring the Danbury Baptists that the legislature would not meddle in the affairs of the church, and using the phrase "separation between church and state" for
the first time); see also Sanford Kessler, Locke's Influence on Jefferson's "Billfor Establishing
Religious Freedom", 25 J. CHURCH & ST. 231, 232 (1983) (stating that Jefferson derived
principles of religious freedom and separation of church and state from John Locke);
J. Clifford Wallace, The Framers' Establishment Clause: How High the Wall?, 2001 BYU L.
REV. 755, 760-69 (describing the efforts of Jefferson and other Founders to reduce
preference toward religion through enactment of the Establishment Clause).

2001]

THE RELIGIOUS TURN IN PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

667

religion as a feature of public life than we see in today's society. If
separation of church and state served as a norm at all in the eighteenth and nineteenthth centuries, it applied only to the federal gov24
emnment, not states or localities . Just taking the academy as an example, the separation of religion from the study of philosophy did not
occur until the twentieth century; training clergy remained a primary
purpose of leading institutions of higher education throughout the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The debate over prayer in public schools often turns into contests over history, but no responsible
historian would deny that publicly-funded schools throughout the
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries taught the Bible and presided over prayers without much opposition 2 5 -that is, without much
mainstream opposition, for the integration of religion and public life
in the United States largely meant Protestantism. The common
school movement in particular confirmed a Protestant culture.26
In contrast, Catholic leaders in the nineteenth century saw public
schools as failing to serve their community; as the century wore on,
anti-Catholic movements pushed for compulsory school laws in order
21
to block the development of parochial, Catholic schools. It took a
Supreme Court decision that rejected compulsory public schooling as
a violation of parents' abilities to influence their children's upbringing to put such laws to rest.2s But during the same period, Protestant
leaders inspired the social gospel movement that influenced the shape
of Progressive era reforms, including the encouragement of evangelical missions that at times conflicted with the religious commitments of
increasing waves of Catholic and Jewish immigrants. 29 Many of these
24 See JAMES W. FRASER, BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE:

RELIGION AND PUBLIC

EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL AMERICA 23 (1999) ("Until the Civil War the consti-

tutional separation of church and state clearly applied only to the federal government.").
25 Id. at 2-3, 46-47.
26 Id. at 43-47.
27 See
ROBERT T. HANDY, UNDERMINED ESTABLISHMENT:
CHURCH-STATE
RELATIONS IN AMERICA, 1880-1920, at 36-48 (1991)

(surveying the Catholic and Protestant public education strategies of the late-nineteenth century and discussing the effects of this clash on "the ways in which the relationship of religion and government
was understood"); see also FRASER, supra note 24, at 49-65 (describing the failed effort
to get public funds for Catholic schools and the subsequent creation of a parochial
school system).
28 Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510,534-35 (1925).
29 HANDY, supra note 27, at 145-57 (discussing the diffiulties faced
by rapidly growing Catholic and Jewish communities attempting to reconcile their faiths with the realities of nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century public education in the United
States).
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immigrant Jews held onto Orthodox practices, surprising both wellestablished German reform Jews and other Americans. The Catholic
leadership decided to hold onto the ethnic and national traditions of
its new immigrants, and as a result, structured parishes and imported
priests to reinforce religious and ethnic practices rather than allow
them to melt into America. Struggles between these groups and the
Protestant majority generated political battles and federal and state
court decisions that increasingly challenged the view of the country as
90
a Protestant nation. Combined with pragmatic cooperation among
religious groups during World War I, these political and legal
devel31
Protestantism.
of
hegemony
implicit
the
opments challenged
Between the 1920s and the 1980s, the emerging public solution
involved greater secularization. This pattern is exhibited partially in
court decisions during the period. 32 Courts approved school instruction about evolution, s recognized nonreligious conscientious objection to military service," rejected instruction in "creation science" by
public schools," prohibited prayer in public schools, 6 and legalized
abortion.3' These decisions supported not only secularization but also
pluralism, and stimulated intense reactions by religious groups. The
Christian "religious right" rose, in part, in reaction to these secularizing legal decisions. Religious academics, public intellectuals, and lawsuits criticized secular humanism as an established religion. 0 And the
30

See H. Frank Way, The Death of the ChristianNation: The Judiciay and Church-State

Relations, 29J. CHURCH & ST. 509, 515-24 (1987) (describing legal challenges to Sabbath-closing laws, prayer- and Bible-reading laws, and sectarian school funding by
Catholic andJewish litigants).
31 HANDY, supra note
27, at 189.
32 One study of religious-related litigation
concluded that federal district courts
"seem[ed] very wary... of offending any religious denomination" and that their decisions were basically "pluralistic." BARBARA M. YARNOLD, RELIGIOUS WARS IN THE
COURTS II:

WHO WERE THE LITIGANTS IN THE U.S. COURTS,

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

CASES 1970-1990, at 11,28 (2000). The study also noted "significant'judicial victories
for an "anti-religion" litigant. Id. at 91-92.
4 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); see FRASER, supra note 24,
at 116-26
(discussing the famous mid-1920s trial ofJohn Scopes and suggesting that even though
Scopes avoided punishment under a Tennessee law that banned teaching evolution
due to a technicality, the cultural impact of the case was to discredit religious fundamentalism).
34 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965).
"4Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
36 School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963).
37 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973).
'9 See Michael W. McConnell, The New Establishmentarianism,
75 Cuii.-KENT L. REv.
453, 453 (2000) ("Orthodoxies come in secular as well as religious varieties."); see also
CARTER, supra note 10, at 171-72 (discussing how judges have characterized secular
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general commitment to tolerance, as well as the dominance of a particular Protestant conception of the private realm as the proper domain of religion, seemed to tell even devout people to treat religion as
a once-a-week, private activity-in tension with the view that religion
affords a complete way of life.
Reacting to the long-term trend of secularization, many religious
people have engaged in "culture wars" over values in the United
States. Leaders of the religious right interestingly have taken advantage of the emerging multicultural framework. That made respect for
diverse identities a foundation in public settings and labeled the
treatment of any group different from others to be dicriminationenabling arguments for equality and accommodation for groups that
had been excluded in the past. An obvious example is the Equal Access movement, which convinced Congress and the Supreme Court to
ensure to religious student groups the same rights to hold meetings
and events accorded to any student organization. 3 ) This development
on the one hand seemed a compromise or middle position between
those who would ban religion from public places and those who

humanism as a religion that therefore cannot be favored by public schools); John
Whitehead & John Conlan, The Establishment of the Religion of Secular Humanism and Its
First Amendment Implications, 10 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 1, 30-31 (1979) ("Secular humanism is a religion whose doctrine worships Man as the source of all knowledge and
truth, whereas theism worships God as the source of all knowledge and truth."). Some
litigants have challenged particular public or employer educational programs as violations of the Establishment Clause or discriminatory on the basis of religion because
they promote secular humanism rather than a theistic religion. See Aguillard, 482 U.S.
at 592 (striking down an act sponsored by a state senator who "repeatedly stated that
scientific evidence supporting his religious [creationist] views should be included in
the public school curriculum to redress the fact that the theory of evolution incidentally coincided with what he characterized as religious beliefs antithetical to his own");
Smith v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 684, 688 (11th Cir. 1987) (reversing the district
court's decision that accepted plaintiff's argument that "textbooks... which were on
the Alabama State Approved Textbook List... unconstitutionally established the religion of secular humanism"); Taylor v. Nat'l Group of Cos., 729 F. Supp. 575, 577 (N.D.
Ohio 1989) (rejecting the plaintiffs employment discrimination claim based on the
distribution of a book to employees that "plaintiff interpreted to embrace secular humanism, a philosophy allegedly at odds with her Christian faith"); see also Nadine

Strossen, "SecularHumanism" and "Scientific Creationism":Proposed Standardsfor Reviewing
CurricularDecisions Affecting Students' Religious Freedom, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 333, 338-54
(1986) (discussing the lack ofjudicial consensus regarding secular humanism in public
schools).
39 See Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1994) (requiring
public secondary
schools to provide student groups equal access to meeting space regardless of the content of the speech that is to occur at the meetings); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens,
496 U.S. 226, 234 (1990) (upholding the Act against an Establishment Clause challenge and finding a violation of the Act).
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would integrate it fully. This development also paralleled political
theories, such as Charles Taylor's, that characterize the current commitments to multicultural tolerance as commitments to recognition.4 °
It is not at all clear whether it is a triumph for the religious to use the
secular framework of pluralism and equality to be heard, or a more
profound victory for the secular.
In either case, by the 1990s, the growing search for religious values and "God-talk" in many settings reflected both the resurgence of
an evangelical, Christian religious right and the prevalence of a tolerant, equal respect framework welcoming to all kinds of identity politics. By this time, the relative comfort of members of religious minorities also seems pertinent. Less concerned with separating religion
from other aspects of life once they had attained more economic and
political security, many Catholics and Jews joined Protestants in displaying and discussing religion in political and scholarly settings. Although Islamic and other groups have been less visible in such activities, in some communities members of these groups have also become
active in public celebrations and discussions.
Increasing American materialism and secularization also
prompted the revival of religious reflection. From the 1980s onward,
members of a variety of religious faiths-and people from both the
right and left of the political spectrum-criticized commercialism and
greed. Tipper Gore found support first among the religious right but
later among secular left-leaning parents in her campaign for labeling
pop music. It was not only conservative religious figures but also posthippy left-leaning parents who began to condemn the commercial
glorification of violence, racism, sexual abuse, and greed in popular
culture. 4' These left-leaning parents also forged alliances with clergy
and organized religious groups. Religious groups have also developed
42
arguments for forgiving international debt by developing nations.

40 E.g., Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM
AND "THE

POLITICS OF RECOGNITION" 25, 63-73 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1992).
41 For example, they rallied against movies such as WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox 1987), which portrayed a fictional corporate raider who adhered to the mantra, "Greed, for lack of a better word, is good."
42 See Samuel E. Goldman, Comment, Mavericks in the Market: The Emergency Problem of Hold-Outs in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 8 UCLAJ. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 159,

163 n.9 (2000) (describing Jubilee 2000/USA, part of a worldwide movement of people and groups seeking to cancel the international debts of the poorest countries by
the new millennium, "inspired by the Biblical concept of 'jubilee' found in Leviticus 25:
every fifty years all debts were to be canceled, land returned to its original owners, and
the oppressed set free").
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It is against this complex backdrop that we should understand the
growing interest in discussing the religious identity and values of law43
yersjudges, doctors, and nurses.
Two kinds of persistent questions emerge for professionals. When
there is a conflict between religious and professional norms, which
should an individual professional follow, or are compromises possible?
For it is not only religion that one may profess. A profession itself encompasses beliefs, practices, and commitments; the two sources can
conflict. And in the absence of such a conflict, what are the benefits
and what are the dangers-for those they serve and for the larger society-if professionals rely on their religions to guide their conduct?
For both questions, analysis must prominently point to respect for the
client or patient, who may have different views on religion. But also
relevant are the norms and practices that should govern private professional institutions, such as law firms and hospitals. And vital as well
are potential effects on the larger civil society, if more emphasis on religion occupies professional training and practice. Lawyers play a disproportionate role in this country's public life. Health care provided
by medical doctors is salient to everyone's quality of life. The ground
rules for religion, equality, and freedom, set by law for private and
public enterprises, may be reshaped if religion plays a different role in
professional identity and practice than it has in the past.
Thus, there are three dimensions that matter. First, there are the
effects on the professional-client relationship. Second, there are effects on civil society. Third, there are consequences for the nation's
ground rules. On each dimension, I find (and I confess, I feel) ambivalence about a growing salience of religious identity and practice.
After sketching such ambivalence, I will return to the persistent questions for professionals and the search for paths through this thicket.
II.

AMBIVALENT RESPONSES

One way to describe the Constitution's use of two phrases governing state and religion is ambivalence. The guarantee of individuals'
free exercise of religion and the prohibition of governmental establishment of religion seem to express simultaneous attraction toward
and repulsion from religion. The apparent tension can be resolved by
emphasizing the Constitution's concern for protecting individual
43 On the growing debate over the benefits and dangers of religion in politics, see

Ruti Teitel, A Critique of Religion as Politics in the Public Sphere, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 747
(1993).
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freedoms in a diverse society. When individuals are involved in diverse, mutually inconsistent, and sometimes antagonistic religions,
government will more readily guard individual freedoms by providing
an across-the-board commitment not to prefer one kind of religion
over others. But the combination of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses also expresses a simultaneous respect for the significance of religion and a profound worry about what happens when
government supports religion.
The historical origins and continuing purposes of the Establishment Clause reflect concerns about governmental intrusions into religion as much as worries about religion moving into the governmental realm. Both concerns argue against public preference for any one
religion, or for religion over nonreligion, even as individuals' religious
views and practices warrant deep respect and protection. And both
concerns caution against any activities that would lead members of
different religions to bring theological and institutional conflicts into
the public sphere, or invite government to monitor or regulate religious belief or practice.
The ambivalence-or high-wire act-embodied in the Constitution's treatment of religion matches my personal ambivalence. As a
student of ethnic and religious conflict in this country and around the
globe, I have become deeply worried about the incendiary effects of
governments and political actors mobilizing people around religious
differences in places such as Bosnia, Israel, and Northern Ireland. As
a member of a religious minority group, I am reminded of the risk of
second-class status, exclusion, and worse. Even mild expressions of
majority religious belief by governmental officials (such as President
Bush's repeated mentioning of Jesus Christ in his Inaugural Address)
can have painful exclusionary effects. Yet I also admire very much the
many individuals who draw upon religion in their lives and their professions. I have great respect for the commitments of groups such as
Catholic Charities, Lutheran Social Missions, and the Jewish Federation to serve people in great need.
More worrisome, to me, are religiously-inflected arguments in the
political realm, yet I acknowledge and often admire the critical and
prophetic perspectives that religious groups contribute to democratic
debate. Religious teachings inspired leaders of the civil rights movement and the antiwar (as in Vietnam War) movement. These movements generated debates and policies that much improved this nation. I learned recently that Michael Harrington's book, The Other
America, which kicked off the War on Poverty, was itself inspired by

2001]

THE RELIGIOUS TURN IN PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

673

Dorothy Day's Catholic Worker movement. 44 My colleague Lucie
White is documenting the remarkable influence of Black women
church leaders on Head Start legislation and practices." I embrace
these ready examples because I agree with their substantive visions.
Although I disagree with the pro-life movement, and abhor violence
committed at times on its behalf, I respect the sincerity of so many of
its advocates and the underlying project to advance appreciation of
and protection for human life regardless of utilitarian claims. I disagree with the religiously inspired absolutism, the particular elevation
of early embryos, and the neglect of the circumstances that drive
many women to seek abortions. But it is not the religious impetus to
the pro-life effort that is troubling, any more than the religious dimensions of civil rights, anti-death penalty, and antiwar arguments
that I do find compelling. 46 Religious beliefs and practices, in each instance, give people bases for criticizing their circumstances and working, by their own light, to improve them. Religion thereby offers a
wellspring of moral and political guidance that can critique and also
replenish our society. Its worth cannot be measured solely in terms of
each particular position taken by religious believers. Thus, I disagree
with John Rawls, who would test the contributions of religious views to
political debate by asking how well they advance values recognized by
reasonable liberal conceptions ofjustice, described as the overlapping
consensus of varied comprehensive views. 47 The very vigor and critical
capacities of political argument depend, in my view, on the contributions of diverse people, drawing on diverse beliefs, traditions, and
points of reference. And the shape of overlapping consensus-the
very boundaries of reasonable liberal conceptions of justice-do and
44 See Acknowledgments for MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA:

POVERTY

IN THE UNITED STATES (1962) ("It was through Dorothy Day and the Catholic Worker
movement that I first came into contact with the terrible reality of involuntary poverty
and the magnificent ideal of voluntary poverty.").
45 Lucie E. White, Raced Histories, Mother Friendships,and the Power of Care: Conversations with Women in ProjectHead Start, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1569 (2001).
46 Stephen L. Carter has offered particularly persuasive arguments supporting
the
role of religion in politics. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD'S NAME IN VAIN: THE
WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF RELIGION IN POLITICS (2000) ("Only by looking at politics

through the lens of faith, rather than faith through the lens of politics, will we be able
to comprehend the nature and resilience (and the sensible limits) of the involvement
of the overtly religious organization and invididuals in our public life."); CARTER, supra
note 10, at 16 (contending that "democracy is best served when the religious are able
to act as independent moral voices interposed between the citizen and the state,
and... our tendency to wall religion out of public debate makes that role a harder
one to play").
47JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133-72
(1993).
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must change over time as people criticize, argue, and struggle with
one another, each informed by life experiences and multiple sources
of values and beliefs.
I do worry about the risk that some may seek to use the instruments of government to impose their views on others rather than to
work for a world that can be held in common.4 And I also worry that
the notable increase in the religious content of political argument will
make communication, trust, and coalition building across different
groups more difficult, and unravel our already fraying public realm.
In the current climate of federal interest in supporting religious solutions to the problem of poverty, I worry about competition for governmental resources and public fights over what even is a religion. Do
Scientologists count? Wiccans? Secular humanists?
Many of these issues may seem largely in the background, however, when religion is joined with professional identity and practice.
Except where the professional fills a public role-such as Attorney
General, Surgeon General of the United States, or Supreme Court
Justice-the professional operates as a private individual whose own
acts do not risk violating the Establishment Clause or the values it represents. Thus, as a theoretical matter, an entirely different set of
problems arises when a judge quotes in an opinion from a Christian
biblical text 9 than when a private attorney quotes the same text while
advising a client. The distinction blurs, however, if the lawyer quotes
the same text in a brief to a court. Similarly, a physician who runs, or
works at, a public hospital is situated differently from one who is in
private practice. Yet this distinction also blurs given the prevalence of
public dollars in the systems for delivering and paying for health care.
Moreover, the very distinction between public and private is one that I
and others have questioned when it comes to application of public
norms, such as antidiscrimination. Others challenge it from a different direction when they object to how privatized and removed from
public discourse are expressions of religious faith. So the distinction
between state and non-state action, or between public and private
realms, does not resolve my ambivalence about growing expressions of
48 See CAROL WEISBROD, THE BOUNDARIES OF UTOPIA
(1980) (examining the litigation conducted between American utopian communities and their former members
over the enforcement of membership contracts); see also Leslie Griffin, Good Catholics
Should Be Rawlsian Liberals, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 297 (1997) (examining arguments
over the place of religion in political debate).
49 See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Phillip Becker,
No. 101981 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1981)
(using the biblical story of Solomon to justify the granting of guardianship in a child
custody dispute), reprinted in FAMILY MATTERS 288, 298 n.9 (Martha Minow ed., 1993).
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religious views and practices by professionals.
Focusing specifically on the place of religion in the professional's
conceptions of role, there is much to admire but also real grounds for
worry. When religion shapes the institutions where law and medicine
are practiced, people who share my ambivalence have grounds for
cheering and for objecting.
Similarly, there is much to commend but also reason to worry
about the use of religious perspectives to develop normative visions to
animate law. I am saddened by descriptions of law as having nothing
to do with justice (even as I acknowledge that we do call these places
law schools, not justice schools). I disagree with those who say that
"[a] lawyer's relationship to justice and wisdom... is on a par with a
piano tuner's relationship to a concert. He neither composes the mu''
sic, nor interprets it-he merely keeps the machinery running. 0
Lawyers-and law-should draw upon all sources of wisdom and
guides for pursuing justice, including religious ones.
But I find much to admire in John Rawls's argument that such viof expression in secular terms, or what he calls
sions must be capable
"public reason. "" This means that reasons used in political discussion
must be accessible to the comprehension, scrutiny, and response of
2
Otherthose who do not share the speaker's religious convictions.
wise, the prospects for open and reasoned debate diminish potentially
irreparably. Speakers with some ostensibly secular views would also be
disciplined by this injunction. Michael Ignatieff has written recently
of the danger that human rights activists, in particular, may be developing a kind of religious attachment to their arguments. Their own
beliefs may seem to insulate them from rational response. Their tone
4
may carry the "triumphalism" associated with religious true believers,
and may be capable of silencing competing views. As a sometime human rights advocate myself, I am stung, usefully, by this critique.
Similar problems arise with professionals who claim religious
authority for their positions or actions. Religiously guided critics of
professionals draw on traditions that others may not share. I can wel-

INTRODUCING C.B. GREENFIELD (1979), quoted in THE BEACON
BOOK OF QUOTATIONS BY WOMEN 184 (Rosalie Maggio ed., 1992).
51 RAWLS, supra note 47, at 212-54.
52 Id. at 224-25.
53 Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Idolatry, in HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND
IDOLATRY 53, 53-55 (Amy Gutmann ed., 2001).
54 See infra note 95 and accompanying text (defining triumphalism and recommending that it be avoided).
50 LUCILLE KALLEN,
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come those religious views as sources of critique meant to inspire a
generally accessible debate over ends, while objecting to any effort to
install the very same religious views as official policies. An example
here is scholarship criticizing the work of individual judges for failing
to reflect the religious teachings associated with the judge's own religious affiliation. I have been especially struck by Maria Failinger's article entitled, The Justice Who Wouldn't Be Lutheran: Toward Borrowing the
Wisdom of Faith Traditions.
The article criticizes Chief Justice
Rehnquist's strict constructionism and deference to government actors with apparent inattention to human hardship. 56 Failinger further
argues that the ChiefJustice fails to recognize the inevitability of conflicting loyalties, loyalties to intimate relationships vis-a-vis loyalties to
the larger community and state.
She claims the teachings of the
Chief Justice's own religion-Lutheranism-would push the balance
precisely in the other direction, toward responding to human hardship and human need. She asserts that "the Lutheran position would
construct a positive vision of the role of the judge, both in restraining
evil and in providing for the nurture of the community.,"5 Failinger
warns against Senate confirmation inquiries into ajudicial candidate's
religious beliefs. Such inquiries would be unduly intrusive, and whatever they could discover would also offer poor predictions of ultimate
judicial performance.
Yet she also cautions against policies that
force judges' religions underground because, in her words, "perhaps
the most important source of self-critique for a judge is his or her
faith." 6 ) I am not sure what Failinger has in mind. But her comments
bring to my mind the willingness of even religious German judges to
implement the Nazi system,"' South African judges to enforce Apartheid, and United States judges to enforce slavery. In light of those examples, I would agree that religious and other sources of selfcritique-and external critique-are essential to check judicial subordination to unjust regimes. Failinger's own punchline is that a relig-

55
56
57
58
59
60

Failinger, supra note
2.
Id. at 674.
Id. at 691-93.

Id. at 676.
Id. at 702-03.
Id. at 704.

6' For a discussion ofjustice in the Third Reich,
see Matthew Lippman, The White
Rose: Judges andJustice in the Third Reich, 15 CONN.J. INT'L L. 95 (2000);
and Richard
Posner, Courting Evil, NEW REPUBLIC, June 17, 1991, at 36 (reviewing INGO
MOLLER,
HITLER'S JUSTICE:

trans., 1991)).
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iously inspired humility would better serve Chief Justice Rehnquist62 in
working out his own commitment to respect democratic outcomes.
I enjoyed Failinger's article and learned from it, although I worry
I like it mostly because it skewers ChiefJustice Rehnquist in terms that
he might hear better than ones posed solely from my political point of
view. I have the same response to criticisms ofJustice Scalia in light of
his Catholicism: 63 a guilty pleasure for one who worries about a vision
of courts that urges judges to consult their religious traditions. Of
course, as Justice Cardozo wrote eloquently, any judge consciously or
unconsciously draws upon the entire range of experiences, training,
64
and beliefs he or she has developed over a lifetime. But the question
is whether the judge should revel in all these influences or instead try
to restrain them while seeking to interpret and apply secular legal
guides. The critic can challenge what the judge does in religious
terms; the judge, too, can question judicial decision making through
religious sources of critique. Butjudicial answers must be guided and
expressed through secular, legal reasons. Indeed, if a judge's religious convictions make it impossible for her to enforce the law as a
secular analysis would indicate, within the actual span for discretion
permitted by the law, she should resign the post, not bend the post to
the religious views."' Similar analyses can address the qualifications of
jurors and grounds for excluding individuals from ajury.
Still, what's not to like in the vision of Lutheranism offered to a
Chief Justice by Failinger? That vision does not conflict with the task
of the secular judge. Instead, it supports a stance for hearing facts
and interpreting law to do justice while respecting democratic institutions. Yet not all interpretations of Lutheranism or other religions
point to humility before democratic outcomes in a pluralist society.
Decision making in light of a judge's religious tradition may be less
resistant to the open argument, critique, and adversarial debate that
our system expects and demands. Most troubling, religious references

62
63

Failinger, supra note 2, at 704.
See, e.g., Joseph C. Cascarelli, The Catholic's Role in the Legal Profession in Republi-

can Government, 39 CATH. LAW. 291, 292, 309-10 (2000) (disagreeing with Justice
Scalia's contention that judges are bound to apply only constitutional and positive law
and arguing in favor of the idea that "a Catholic legal professional bears the obligation
of creating and nourishing an atmosphere that is receptive to natural law as a recognized, legitimate body of law").
64 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THEJUDICIAL PROCESS 113 (1921).
for a discussion of whether
65 See ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975),
antebellum judges who disagreed with the Fugitive Slave Laws should have resigned
rather than enforce the law.
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and guidance-however well-motivated and however universalistic in
their outcome-risk signaling (or worse, implementing) the exclusion
for some and inclusion for others that a democratic society committed
to freedom and equality must resist.
Moving from judges to lawyers, elevating religion as the conscious
guide could resolve what some call an "ethical schizophrenia" produced by a professional role conception. That professional role seems
to require separation from the individual's beliefs and values."" Thomas Shaffer's landmark work, On Being a Christian and a Lawyer, 7 offers a powerful and admirable cure-at least for those who share his
views about ways to bring conscience and care to law practice. He rejects a professional role conception that requires separation from
one's beliefs and values.68 He also recasts certain professional commitments to render them more compatible with Christian ethics. 6!
Thus, he calls for revising the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client and
S 70
recasting it as a duty of fidelity.
The duty of fidelity would support
counseling the client and preserving the right to raise moral objections rather than serving as a hired gun, doing whatever the client
wants, as the duty of loyalty may imply.' Shaffer also argues that lawyers can and should help clients search for conciliation and reconciliation rather than search for power.7"
Informed by Christian beliefs, this recommendation etches a path
that would help many people combine their religious and moral beliefs with the practice of law. But if all lawyers followed this search for
conciliation, instead of pressing adversarial interests and adverse
rights, I confess I would worry. I would worry about so truncated a
range of lawyering styles for a client who seeks to vindicate a right, not
reconcile with an opponent, or whose sense of violation would be
compounded, not assisted, by efforts to seek reconciliation. I would
worry about the lawyer who is so intent on conciliation that he or she
does not explore with the client all the litigation options. I would be
concerned for those who do not share the lawyer's religious views.

66 See Levine, supra note 6, at 146 ("In
response to the dichotomy between personal and professional values, some lawyers attempt to develop a corresponding dichotomy in their personalities... (footnote omitted)).
67 SHAFFER,
supra note 3.
68
69
70
71
72

Id. at 32-33.

Id. at 89, 192.
Id. at 87.

Id. at 99.
Id. at 111, 132.

THE RELIGIOUS TURN IN PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

2001]

679

And I would be concerned for an adversary system predicated on
competitive fact-finding and argument. The system will not work if
the lawyers appearing in court curtail the arguments available to them
in an effort to promote reconciliation between the opposing parties.
Some others have argued that Christian lawyers can and should
provide religious and moral counsel. Daniel Conkle notes with approval a lawyer's reference to the Bible to remind a client to make de4
cisions based on the client's sense of morality. But he does caution
against an aggressive evangelism, in order to respect a religiously plI74
ral society and ensure effectiveness. I would add my hope that evangelistic lawyers would give notice to clients ahead of time that religious
ministry or counsel is part of their practice, either to make it less embarrassing and less expensive for the client who does not want this
part of the relationship to change lawyers or to opt out of this portion
of the lawyer's services. Such notice would respect pluralism, help the
lawyer who wants to be effective, and also restrain the use of the attorney's power in consulting a vulnerable client.
I have not found much by United States scholars on Islamic,
Hindu, or Buddhist lawyering, although I am still looking. There is,
however, a growing literature on being a Jewish lawyer. I suppose it is
some source of comfort for ambivalent people like me that this scholarship on Jewish lawyering is too filled with disagreements about what
being Jewish offers to lawyering to provide much of a threat to the
range of approaches to lawyering. As a Jew familiar with how Jews
raise arguments about everything Jewish, this makes me chuckle.
Sandy Levinson's articles alone include at least five alternative concepr
tions joining Jewishness and lawyering, and other scholars add still
more.7 6 I admire Seth Kreimer's interpretation of Jewish tradition as

73 See Conkle, supra note 6, at 167-69 (giving an example of a lawyer
who cites to
"relevant Scripture" when advising Christian personal injury clients to return to work
when they are physically capable of working, despite the potential legal advantages of
remaining unemployed).

74

Id. at 180.

His proposed five models are: (a) a Jewish lawyer is someone who is both a lawyer and Jewish-but then the community can fight over who is a lawyer; (b) a Jewish
lawyer expresses social and political solidarity with other Jews, ethnicity rather than
commandments; (c) a Jewish lawyer takes days off of work to observe holidays but
leaves the norms of practice unchanged; (d) a Jewish lawyer practices in Jewish courts;
and (e) a Jewish lawyer follows Jewish law, limits scope of contact with secular courts,
and elevatesJewish law over secular law. Sanford Levinson, Identfying theJewish Layrer"
75

Reflections on the Constructionof ProfessionalIdentity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1577, 1583-1611

(1993).
76

See, e.g.,

LESNICK,

supra note 5, at 158 (citing Seth Kreimer's view thatJewish
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urging lawyers to support those who are disadvantaged." This is,
however, only one of many readings of what the tradition means for
lawyering in America. One that Sandy Levinson discusses elevates the
ethnic rather than the religious dimension and urges a kind of inter8
est-group-politics approach to lawyering.1
I am not sure what this means. But I worry about a use of ethnic
pride in lawyering, whether by Jews or others, if this in any way leads
to the appearance or actual practice of bias against members of other
groups in the way deals are negotiated or suits are litigated. Justice
Thurgood Marshall used to tell of secret signals used by lawyers to jurors, reflecting their shared membership in all-white Masonic lodges.
Any direct or indirect signaling of membership and non-membership
could so jeopardize the perception and fairness of the legal process; it
is another reason to be scrupulous in confining religion away from the
public corridors of law practice. Signaling a private language that operates by membership rather than argument threatens even the pretense of equality and transparency that allows us to criticize departures from those ideals.
The settings of private law practice-law firms, corporate counsel
departments, and public interest practices-can be influenced by the
religious beliefs and affiliations of their founders and managers. Michael Kelly describes one law firm whose chief clients are Roman
Catholic institutions and whose common purposes include a spirit of
cooperation and earned reputations for public service, quality lawyering, and effective service.' It certainly looks like an appealing placeeven though (or perhaps in part because?) the attorney compensation

tradition teaches an obligation to those who are not fortunate); Jos6 Faur, Law and
Hermeneutics in RabbinicJurisprudence: A Maimonidean Perspective, 14 CARDOZO L. REV.
1657 (1993) (implying that a Jewish lawyer uses rabbinic hermeneutics in interpreting
law);Jerome Hornblass, The Jewish Lawyer, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1639, 1647 (1993) (describing the Jewish lawyer as one who defends Jewish interests and "manifests the holiness of being Jewish in his or her daily life"); Russell G. Pearce, Jewish Lawyering in a
Multicultural Society: A Midrash on Levinson, 14 CARDozo L. REv. 1613, 1621-22 (1993)
(citing Jack Greenberg as an example of a lawyer whose Jewishness led him to identify
with the struggle of African Americans for equality and justice).
77Seth Kreimer, The Responsibilities of the Jewish Lawyer
3 (1993) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author), quoted in LESNICK, supra note 5, at 158.
78 Levinson, supra note 75, at 1590-94 (categorizing
Jewish lawyers, such as Alan
Dershowitz, who "feel a high degree of membership in, and presumably a loyalty to, a
specifically Jewish community, regardless of whether there is an explicitly religious
element to this identification").
79

MICHAEL

J.

KELLY, LIVES OF LAWYERS:

PRACTICE 53, 78-83 (1994).

JOURNEYS IN THE ORGANIZATIONS OF
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is notably lower than at comparable firms."s Kelly does not discuss
how that firm-given a fictional name in his book-hires, or whether
it seeks or discourages non-Catholic lawyers and staff, and I have no
reason to believe that it discriminates. Surely, if a given religious institution believed it needed to employ exclusively lawyers affiliated with
its tradition, it could hire such lawyers, and even build an internal law
practice."' Yet, historical practices of religious exclusion, informally
replaced by religious "clubbiness" at other law firms, make me worry.
This is why Title VII antidiscrimination
• 82 norms do-and should-apply
to law firms above the minimum size. Because sites of law practices
are work settings like any other, the commitment to creating a society
open to all should be carried out there; because law is so tied to public
norms and institutions, fulfilling this commitment is, if anything,
greater for law practice settings. This includes accommodating the
individual lawyer's religious beliefs.
Such accommodations would include permitting the lawyer to observe religious holidays, hours of prayer, dietary restrictions, and
clothing requirements. Reasonable accommodations should also allow a lawyer to refuse to work for a particular client or cause when his
objection grows from religious or sincerely held conscience grounds.
Similarly, neither courts nor the bar should refuse to accommodate a
lawyer's religious beliefs or conscience when a court seeks to appoint
a lawyer to represent a client.
Thus, I think that the Board of Professional Responsibility of the
Tennessee Supreme Court wrongly concluded that a Catholic lawyer
could not decline to represent a minor seeking an abortion even
though the lawyer claimed that such representation violated his relig-

soId. at 75-76.
81

Such discrimination on the basis of religion in employment is permitted. See 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1994) (exempting religious institutions from certain prohibitions on
employment discrimination); see also Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding the Tite VII
exemption for discrimination by religious institutions).
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994) (defining "employer" to include firms with fifteen or more employees); see also EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175, 179-81
(N.D. Ill.
1975) (concluding that associates of a small firm count as employees, in addition to the secretaries and clerks, for the purposes of determining whether an employer is subject to Title VII).
8
Cf United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965) (holding that
a conscientious objector needs to have a "sincere and meaningful belief" that plays the same role
in her life that a similar belief plays in the lives of those who have already qualified for
the exemption). There, as with Title VII, the question is how to construe a statutory
reference to religion.
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ious beliefs. 4 Indeed, this might even be an instance of wrongful efforts to establish secularism and surely to constrain the free exercise
of an individual's religion. The duty to ensure representation under
the Sixth Amendment for indigent criminal defendants and the more
general duty to represent unpopular clients does not and should not
oblige individual lawyers to represent any particular client, especially
in the absence of demonstration that no one else will do so. 85 If it
truly came to pass that no one could be found to represent an individual but the lawyer who has a religious objection, then my ambivalence would surface, but I think we can wait for such a moment to resolve the matter. Even where the lawyer-out of conscience or
religious belief-would object to representing the pregnant minor client who seeks an abortion, professional duty should be understood to
require the lawyer, consulted by that individual, to disclose the option
of going t9 court or else to refer her to someone who would offer that
kind of representation.
Some related issues arise in health care. Should an individual
physician be able to refuse to provide a particular medical treatment-contraception, abortion, end-of-life pain medication-that
might shorten life? The Catholic Church's teachings are explicit on
this subject, and a believing Catholic physician has a real dilemma,
pitting client care against the professional's religious belief.8" So
would many OrthodoxJews.
Some Catholic physicians and nurses address the problem by giv84

Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn., Formal Op. 96-F-140

(1996). For a thorough discussion of the issue, see Teresa Stanton Collett, Professional
Versus Moral Duty: Accepting Appointments in Unjust Civil Cases, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
635 (1997), ultimately arguing that a lawyer should be able to refuse a case on moral
or ethical grounds. The Code of Professional Responsibility urges lawyers to accept
appointments absent "compelling reasons," MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY
EC 2-29 (1980), and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct announce a duty to accept court appointments absent "good cause," MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
6.2 (2000). Religious reasons should count under both exceptions.
85 A particular law job may involve
so much work that an individual may object on
religious or conscientious grounds that she simply cannot do the job as explained by
the employer. Presumably, a lawyer who establishes sufficient reasons to refrain from
one appointment would retain the duty to accept other appointments that do not trigger the same objections.
86 Other issues can arise. For example,
should an individual physician seek to
promote fetal survival even at the cost of overriding a pregnant mother's refusal to
have a cesarean section? See Kelly F. Bates, Note, CesareanSection Epidemic: Defining the
Problem-ApproachingSolutions, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 389, 399 (1995) (noting that doctors who oppose abortion on moral or religious grounds might override such refusal
based on the view that a woman's refusal to undergo a cesarean birth is "cruel or ignorant").
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ing patients referrals, if they want them, for the services that the
health care professional will not provide. This may inconvenience but
still serve the patients; for many individual physicians and nurses, referrals represent an uncomfortable compromise. But the physician or
nurse who refuses to give referrals or even disclose the options to the
patient, in my view, disserves the patient, often severely. Professor
Sylvia Law has effectively argued that the First Amendment does not
protect a physician from an obligation to refer a patient for services
the physician does not want to perform. 87 As states explore physicianassisted suicide, a wider group of health care professionals will experience conflicts between their religious convictions and the duty to
serve patients. If this kind of tension drives away thoughtful, religious
people from sectors of the health care professions, I worry that the net
effect is a negative one not only for them but for the society.
Even more difficult issues arise at the level of the institutional
practice. Secular and religious but non-Catholic health care institutions, such as large hospitals and health care centers, can provide
more latitude for the individual Catholic health care provider. As a
result, the individual physician or nurse may be able to avoid performing procedures that offend his or her religious beliefs. They still
should not be able to avoid making referrals, however.88 If the health
care provider is a Catholic institution, an entirely different set of issues
may arise. The Church's leaders have interpreted Church teachings
to prohibit provision of abortions, and as private institutions, such facilities should have the ability to control their operations in line with
their missions and commitments. If they have public contracts and
funding, though, there really is a dilemma. The government could set
conditions on the use of the public money (although the courts have
not been willing to impose any), but the Catholic institutions may
then simply refuse the public dollars-and become even less able to
fulfill their mission to serve the poor and needy, a mission which obviously helps the broader society as well.
In the meantime, the number of mergers between Catholic and
non-Catholic hospitals is rising sharply. In about half of the mergers

87

Sylvia A. Law, Silent No More: Physicians' Legal and Ethical Obligations to Patients

Seeking Abortions, 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 279, 302 (1995).
Such accommodations may flow from Title VII or state religious freedom
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over the past decade, all or some reproductive health services previ89
ously provided by the non-Catholic institution have been eliminated .
State attorneys general, entrusted with the responsibility of approving
such mergers, typically treat the approval process solely as a matter of
antitrust and assessment of need. In addition to those criteria, they
could consider the impact of the mergers on the constitutionallyprotected right for individuals to make their own reproductive
choices. But they usually do not, due to the multiple considerations
involved in a merger, complex political contexts, and concerns about
preserving medical services in rural and urban areas.
I hope that the availability of reproductive services can become a
factor in decision making by attorneys general or elsewhere that other
governance structures can become involved. For the pluralism that
protects the choices of the Catholic institutions must also protect the
choices of patients whose rights include pursuing treatment that the
Catholic institutions do not provide. This is the challenge of preserving the overarching framework within which pluralism can work for
all people!"
Religion often does not conflict with a professional role, but instead strengthens individuals who act as professionals. One physician
explained to me that religion is central to his conception of his work,
and offered as an example the fact that the first question he asks residents during rounds is the patient's name and that he will not review
the patient's status without knowing that name (and making sure that
the resident knows the name).92 For this doctor, learning the name
helps to see the patient as a whole person, and to remember that it is
a privilege to serve the person in need. These perspectives, in his
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view, are framed by his religious understandings. Conflict between
such views and professional role could arise, however, in the everincreasing pressures to reduce "expensive" physician time with patients in the regimes of managed care. Religiously motivated health
care providers are likely to encounter increasing conflicts with the expectations and rules of health care organizations where curtailments
in attention and services are mandated.
This reminds me of the emerging debates over government funding for religious organizations to provide social services. Most of the
controversy on this subject centers on the potential risk of government appearing to establish religion, or else on the compromises-if
any-that the religious organizations must make to receive government funding. Yet the more profound danger may come if religious
groups are restrained from critiquing governmental policies, such as
cutbacks in welfare and human services. Similarly, preoccupation with
the borders between religious practice and institutional rules, however
fascinating, may distract us from the larger policy issues about access
to health care and legal services, where the participation of religious
groups can play a vital role.

III. GUIDES FOR THE AMBIVALENT
Ah, time grows near for a conclusion. I feel a little bit like Vita
Sackville-West, who once commented, "I have come to the conclusion,
sad experience, that you cannot come
after many years of sometimes
93
to any conclusion at all."
Yet even with my ambivalence, I have been hinting at my own
conclusions about how professionals should respond to conflicts between their professional role and religious commitments. I have suggested that where there are conflicts between the professional's role
and deeply held religious beliefs, the individual should seek a way to
meet the needs of the client or patient-through referrals if necessary-or to shift away from work in the field of conflict, or else resign
the professional role. The professional norms may be thin in some
respects, but here they are thick. Failure to educate a patient or client
about her options as they exist under prevailing standards of practice
breaches these professional norms.
I have also suggested that where there are conflicts between a religiously governed practice setting for professionals and rights en93VITA SACKVILLE-WEST, IN YOUR GARDEN AGAIN (1953), quoted in THE BEACON
BOOK OF QUOTATIONS BY WOMEN, supra note

50, at 62.
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sured by the secular state to patients and clients, responsibility shifts to
those who govern the mix of institutions to ensure that patients' and
clients' rights can be met. And I have indicated the vital role that religious belief and practice can play in both inspiring individual professionals to do their hard daily work and inspiring persistent but external critiques of the professional practices and institutions.
Where there is no obvious conflict between professional duty and
religious commitment, it would seem that an individual could pursue
the religious guidance fully. Yet here, I expressed caution about truncating the range of professional services and strategies. And I expressed my worries about signaling bias and exclusion toward any but
co-religionists if a professional makes religious language and values
dominant in the professional practice. The religiously guided professional should also disclose his or her reliance on religious values to
avoid misleading the client and to ensure acknowledgment of alternative approaches.
Along the way, I have considered but found inadequate a range of
guideposts to mark where religion should run unfettered and where it
should be restrained. The distinction between public practice and
private practice, at first appealing, simply fades in our world of intermingled public and private activities, funds, and institutions. I considered drawing the line between the personal, individual action and
the institutional design for professional practice, but this too cannot
mark the places for religious guidance from those where religion
should stay out. I do find much to recommend John Rawls's view that
religion can offer springboards for action but notjustifications in public life.' 4 Otherwise, the prospects for communication across different
groups grow very dim, and the occasions for using religious authority
as a club-of both the weapon and social variety-jeopardizes equality, participation, and mutual exchange. But Rawls's own recommendation is complex and difficult to clarify. If acceptable justifications
are those found in an overlapping consensus-marking the convergence between comprehensive views, like religions and ideologiesthen separating springboards and justifications can be a sticky
business. It is also likely as much a function of a given historical
movement as anything else whether a particular argument appears
accessible to people who hold a different comprehensive view.
I am humbled by the difficulty of sharply concluding what place
religion should have in the lives of professionals in a pluralist society.
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Humility is itself, of course, often a deeply religious notion. But, so
often, its opposite seems to come with the territory of religious practice and identity. Did you hear about the two Christian ministers who
concluded an ecumenical conference where they had shared respectful discussions of their denominational differences? One grasped the
hand of his new friend, and reported, "I now see that we both worship
God; you in your way, and me in His."
And then there is the classic story about the rabbi, cantor (singer),
and shammas (custodian) who were in the sanctuary preparing the
synagogue for Yom Kippur, the highest holiday of the year. Suddenly,
overcome with religious fervor, the rabbi throws himself down on the
ground before the Ark, containing the Torah, and says, "Before you,
Almighty One, I am nothing, I am less than a speck of dust, please
bless me, please forgive me." Seeing the rabbi on the floor, the cantor
throws himself down on the floor and says, "Before you, Almighty
God, I am nothing, I am less than a squeak of the door, I am nothing,
please bless me, forgive me." The shammas is mopping up in the back
of the room. Seeing the rabbi on the floor and the cantor on the
floor, he throws himself down on the ground too, saying, "Almighty
God, I am nothing, I am nothing, I am nothing." At which point, the
cantor nudges the rabbi, points to the shammas, and says, "Look who
thinks he's nothing!"
Pride or smugness, even in the guise of humility, is unfortunately
a familiar feature or impression associated with religiosity. Some devout people I know deliberately keep their religiosity private for fear
of implying a "holier than thou" attitude. That kind of restraint is
admirable, but the resulting divisions of the self are unfortunate. The
individual may feel torn and unable to integrate two sets of beliefs; the
profession may be deprived of enriching sources of values and critique; clients and the broader society may be short-changed as well.
Yet professionals who live and work in a multireligious and multicultural society must also comport with secular values and ensure equal
respect for clients and patients, whatever their affiliations. So should
the institutions set up to deliver professional services. I think this entails avoiding what Howard Lesnick calls "triumphalism" or even its
appearance: The secular professions of law and medicine need the
humility and the questions that religious sources and concerns can
sustain. But resisting the implication that your religious convictions
See LESNICK, supra note 5, at 53-65 (describing "triumphalism" as the manner in
which "many who profess a belief, especially a religious belief, in the existence of truth
about morality tend to believe as well that they [exclusively] know the truth").
95
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give all the answers-for you and for those you serve-may be the
most critical challenge for those who would overtly combine religion
and professional identity.

